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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-HABEAS
CORPUS-WAIVER OF RELIEF UNDER THE
WEST VIRGINIA POST-CONVICTION HABEAS
CORPUS ACT
The petitioner was tried for murder in the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County under an indictment which charged that he "fe-
loniously, wilfully, maliciously, deliberately, and unlawfully did
slay, kill, and murder one Henry Russell.' The jury returned the
following verdict: "[W]e the jury find John Wayne Ford Guilty
in the within indictment as charged."2 Although the jury verdict
did not specify the degree of murder, the court imposed a life
sentence for first degree murder. The jury's failure to specify the
degree of murder was brought to the attention of petitioner's coun-
sel. 3 Counsel, however, failed to seek amendment of the verdict,
and judgment was entered. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas cor-
pus in order to overturn his conviction. Held, writ denied. Even
though the West Virginia Code requires that the jury shall specify
the degree of murder in its verdict,4 the petitioner "intelligently
and knowingly failed to advance [this deficiency] on direct ap-
peal" as required by the West Virginia Post-Conviction Habeas
Corpus Act5 and, therefore, waived his right to relief under the Act.
The court further held that even though the verdict did not state
the degree of murder, the fact that the murder occurred during the
commission of a robbery precluded a verdict of second degree mur-
der. Relying on the record from the trial court, the court deter-
mined that if error had been committed, it was not prejudicial.
Ford v. Coiner, 196 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 1972).
The major issue confronting the court in Ford was whether the
West Virginia Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act is available to
a petitioner seeking relief from sentencing on a faulty verdict. The
'Ford v. Coiner, 196 S.E.2d 91, 92 (W. Va. 1973).
1Id. at 93.
Although he later changed his mind about having the verdict amended, the
prosecuting attorney made the following statement in open court:
I would ask if an amendment could be made to the verdict, and then poll
the jury to make certain that the amendment is correct. As I understand
the law, it is "Guilty as charged in the within indictment," that means
first degree murder; I would like to have that added to the indictment,
"guilty of first degree murder as charged in the within indictment."
196 S.E.2d at 94.
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-15 (1966) provides: "If a person indicted for murder
be found by the jury guilty thereof, they shall in their verdict find whether he is
guilty of murder of the first or second degree."
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-4A-1 (1966).
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Act, instituted to remedy shortcomings in State habeas corpus
procedures that forced petitioners into federal courts for relief, was
designed to provide a broader basis for habeas corpus relief on the
State level. The majority decision severely limits the availability
of the Act, even in the area of Constitutional rights. Because of the
potential impact of the decision on future cases, the opinion must
be examined to determine whether the decision was well-founded
upon legal precedent.
In West Virginia, there can be no specific indictment for first
degree murder; only a general murder indictment is permitted.'
The jury is required to determine from the evidence whether the
defendant is guilty and, if they so find, to set forth the degree of
murder of which he is convicted. Although the jury in Ford failed
to specify the degree of murder, the trial court examined the evi-
dence and the statutory definition of first degree murder and im-
posed judgment as if the verdict had read guilty of first degree
murder. The majority was "not unmindful"7 of the code provision
which calls for the jury to state the degree of murder in their
verdict 8 and of the holdings in State v. McCoy' and State v. May"
that a verdict in a murder trial which does not specify the degree
of murder is fatally defective. Although the majority recognized
that the verdict in Ford constituted error, it held that such error
must be raised on direct appeal, and failure to do so results in a
waiver under the Act."
Justice Haden dissented, contending that it is not within the
court's power to invade the province of the jury by construing a
jury's verdict and entering judgment not in accordance with the
'State v. Skeen, 138 W. Va. 116, 75 S.E.2d 223 (1953).
'196 S.E.2d at 94.
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-15 (1966).
195 W. Va. 274, 120 S.E. 597 (1923). The defendant was sentenced to imprison-
ment for life on a charge of murder. An assignment of error was based upon a jury
verdict which stated: "We the jury agree and find the defendant, J.C. McCoy,
guilty as charged within the indictment, and further recommend mercy." The court
found the verdict fatally defective because, under the statute dealing with verdicts
and sentences in murder cases, a verdict of guilty in a murder case must state
whether the defendant is guilty of murder in the first or second degree.
1162 W. Va. 129, 57 S.E. 366 (1907). The defendants were convicted of first
degree murder for killing an individual by ambush. The appellant was indicted
under the general murder indictment, and the jury returned a verdict merely find-
ing the defendant guilty "as charged in the within indictment." The court set aside
the judgment and awarded a trial de novo, holding that a verdict which does not
establish the degree of murder is fatally defective.
"196 S.E.2d at 94.
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jury's finding, since such an invasion constitutes a deprivation of
the petitioner's constitutional right to trial by jury. 2 The trial
court had held that the rule of the McCoy and May cases, as well
as the statute dealing with the verdict and sentence in murder
cases, applied only to ordinary murder cases and not to felony-
murder cases such as this one. The dissent, however, stressed the
mandatory nature of West Virginia Code chapter sixty-two, article
three, section fifteen, emphasizing the word "shall" within the
statute.' 3 Justice Haden felt examination of both May and McCoy,
as well as other cases not cited by the majority, further substanti-
ated this view." However, none of these cases involved a felony-
murder, where the degree of murder is determined by its statutory
definition.
Ford was tried under the Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus
Act.' 5 In holding that the petitioner had waived his right to habeas
relief, the court cited the following portion of the Act:
11Id. at 98 (dissenting opinion).
13Id. at 96 (dissenting opinion). The text of the statute is set out in note 4 supra.
"In State v. Hager, 50 W. Va. 370, 40 S.E. 393 (1901), the defendant was
convicted of assault with intent to kill. The court affirmed the verdict of the jury,
holding that, because specification of the degree of murder attempted is indispensa-
ble to the rendition of judgment, the verdict in this case was proper because it
contained such specifications. In State v. Davis, 74 W. Va. 657, 82 S.E. 525 (1914),
the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. The court affirmed the lower
court's judgment, recognizing that the degree of murder must be specified by the
jury. The court also held that a jury verdict could be corrected at the request of
the court before discharge of the jury and that a second verdict establishing the
correct degree would be sustained.
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-4A-1 (1966).The West Virginia Post-Conviction Ha-
beas Corpus Act was enacted in 1967 in response to a series of United States
Supreme Court cases which permitted institution of habeas corpus proceedings in
federal court upon conviction in a state court. These cases permitted federal courts
to pre-empt state courts in the handling of certain criminal cases. Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 327 U.S. 335 (1963), the first of these opinions, held that, under the sixth
and fourteenth amendments, an indigent defendant in a state criminal trial is
guaranteed the right to counsel unless that right is intelligently waived. Since
Gideon, the states have followed the rule that the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights are protected against state abridgement by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The decisions in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963); and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), established that where a
basic federal right, such as the right of an accused against self-incrimination, is at
issue, and the state court denies relief on the ground that the accused "intelligently
and understandingly" waived the right in question, the state court decision involves
a question of federal constitutional law. Because of the presence of a federal ques-
tion, the federal court is given the right eo instanti to make its independent ruling
on that question and apply its own standards.
[Vol. 76
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"For the purposes of this article, a contention or contentions
and grounds in fact or law relied upon in support thereof shall
be deemed to have been waived when the petitioner could have
advanced, but intelligently and knowingly failed to advance
such contention or contentions and grounds before trial, at trial,
or on direct appeal ....
Since the deficiency in the jury's verdict was raised in open court,
with petitioner's counsel making no objection, and since the court
affirmed the verdict as one of first degree murder, the majority felt
that the knowing and intelligent waiver required by the Act had
been made, thus precluding any relief.
The dissenting opinion questioned whether the matter of
waiver was raised correctly from a procedural standpoint since it
was not properly raised as an affirmative defense by the State and
the petitioner had been given no opportunity to respond to the
defense.' 7 More importantly, Justice Haden did not believe a
waiver had occurred since the error complained of involved a con-
stitutional right which he considered specifically non-waivable
under the Act.'8 While the dissent recognized the knowing and
intelligent waiver concept relied on by the majority, Justice Haden
pointed out the exception to the waiver principle whereby all con-
tentions are waived, "unless such contention or contentions are
such that, under the Constitution of the United States or the Con-
stitution of this State, they cannot be waived under the circum-
stances giving rise to the alleged waiver."' 9
In determining that the exception should have applied in this
case, the dissent analyzed the type of right involved, whether the
right could be waived, and what test of waiver must be applied.
Justice Haden reasoned that the entering of judgment on a faulty
verdict denied petitioner's right to trial by jury."0 This right, pro-
tected under both the United States and West Virginia Constitu-
The West Virginia statute was enacted to meet three goals: (1) To provide a fair
and complete adjudication of the rights of an accused in a state court; (2) to provide
for timely and final conclusion of criminal litigation; and (3) to protect the legiti-
mate interest of the state in defining and adjudicating crimes within its boundaries
and fixing the punishment therefore. 196 S.E.2d at 100.
'6W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-4A-1(c) (1966).
"1196 S.E.2d at 97 (dissenting opinion).
18Id. at 101 (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 99 (dissenting opinion). This provision of the Act was given great weight
by the dissent while the majority failed to note it.
20Id. at 99 (dissenting opinion).
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tions, 2' has been recognized as a fundamental right in decisions
rendered by the United States Supreme Courtz and the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals.2
Gideon v. Wainwright, 24 which guaranteed the right of counsel
to an accused in a criminal case, and Fay v. Noia,2 which involved
the right to freedom from self-incrimination, both recognized that
fundamental constitutional rights can be waived, but held that the
waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record or from the silence
of the accused. West Virginia has applied a similar test for waiver.
In a case involving the right to counsel, the court held that waiver
must be made "intelligently and understandingly. '2 Waiver,
therefore, will not be presumed from the failure of the accused to
request counsel, from his entry of a guilty plea, or by reason of a
record silent on the matter of counsel. Indeed, this test of waiver
was recognized by the West Virginia court to be applicable in a
case dealing with the same type of constitutional denial as was
present in Ford-the denial of a defendant's right to trial by jury."1
'U.S. CONST. amends. VI & XIV; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10.
"Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Appellant, convicted of simple
battery and sentenced to sixty days in prison and a fine of $150, was denied a jury
trial because the Louisiana constitution grants jury trials only in cases where capi-
tal punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed. The Louisiana
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Appellant sought review, alleging a federal ques-
tion, and the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The Su-
preme Court held that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the Ameri-
can scheme of justice and is guaranteed to the states by the fourteenth amendment
in all criminal cases which, were they tried in federal court, would come within the
sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury. The Court held that the penalty of
up to two years in prison for the offense in question was sufficient to subject the
case to the mandates of the sixth amendment.
"State ex rel. Fountain v. King, 149 W. Va. 511, 142 S.E.2d 59 (1965). This
case recognized trial by jury as a constitutional right and provided that a person
accused of a crime may waive his constitutional right to trial by jury if such waiver
is made intelligently and with understanding.
24372 U.S. 335 (1963).
-372 U.S. 391 (1963).21State ex rel. May v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 155, 139 S.E.2d 177 (1964).
2State ex rel. Fountain v. King, 149 W. Va. 511, 142 S.E.2d 59 (1965).
In a trial for felonious assault, Fountain was asked a series of questions to determine
if he understood that he had a right to be represented by an attorney, that he had
a right to trial by jury, that he could waive these rights and enter a plea. He
responded "yes" to each question. He was then informed of the charge and the
maximum penalty and asked whether he wished to plead guilty or not guilty.
Fountain pleaded guilty. The court held this was an intelligent and understanding
waiver of Fountain's constitutional right to counsel.
(Vol. 76
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The American Bar Association recognizes two types of
waiver-the foreclosure by judgment waiver and the voluntary re-
linquishment waiver. " The foreclosure by judgment concept re-
quires that claims must be raised at a certain time or in a certain
way or else they will be considered waived. Under this test, a party
can lose his rights by being silent or by waiting too long to raise
the issue. Under the voluntary relinquishment test, a party to a
criminal action can intelligently and understandingly forego cer-
tain rights if he is actively involved in the relinquishment process.
This active, intelligent waiver of a right will be binding, since the
party is involved and aware of the fact he is giving up a right and
does not waive it by mere silence. While recognizing both types of
waiver, the American Bar Association adopted the voluntary relin-
quishment test rather than foreclosure by judgment in regard to
waiver of rights in post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings.
The dissent, in analyzing the recent federal case, Leftwich v.
Coiner,29 concluded that this standard was recognized under the
West Virginia Act, at least by implication."0 In Leftwich, the Amer-
ican Bar Association standards were cited in regard to jurisdiction
for post-conviction relief, and the court concluded that the West
Virginia statute enables the Supreme Court of Appeals to accom-
plish the functions recommended by the American Bar Association
standards. Justice Haden reasoned that this impliediy included
the recommendations concerning waiver.31
If the voluntary relinquishment test had been applied in Ford,
the court would have found no grounds for waiver. The petitioner
made no active, knowing choice to relinquish his right to trial by
jury as required by the test. Instead, he merely remained silent in
regard to that issue. Examining the intent behind the promulga-
tion of this statute, the fear expressed by Justice Haden that this
decision, "ruling that one may silently waive a basic constitutional
right," will once more require the federal judiciary to step in and
protect the rights of an accused in a criminal case2 appears to be
true. Indeed, this decision could "render the [Post-Conviction
Habeas Corpus Act] a vessel empty of the justice it sought to
carry."3
"A.B.A., STANDARDS RELATING TO POsT-CONvICTION REMEDIES §§ 2.1, 6.1, at 87-
89 (tentative draft 1967).
424 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1970).
:'196 S.E.2d at 102 (dissenting opinion).
31ld. at 102 (dissenting opinion).
24d. at 103 (dissenting opinion).
3Id. at 104 (dissenting opinion).
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The West Virginia Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act was
enacted to provide a complete forum within the State judicial
system to any person incarcerated under a State conviction and to
consider, by means of a full hearing, all State and federal constitu-
tional issues in the State court. This intent seems thwarted by the
Ford decision. The majority appeared more concerned with the
procedural aspects of alleged error than with the substance of the
contentions and whether the rights involved can be waived. The
dissent, on the other hand, considered the substance of the alleged
error rather than its form alone and strived to protect, within the
framework of a State court proceeding, the constitutional rights of
the petitioner. The concern exhibited by Justice Haden seems to
be more clearly in line with the spirit behind the Habeas Corpus
Act. It is unfortunate that the other members of the court were not
convinced by this approach for, indeed, this decision may result in
a surge of federal litigation, causing a renewal of the federal courts'
pre-emption of the state courts' handling of habeas corpus litiga-
tion.
Steven E. Deem
[Vol. 76
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